Lawfare Daily: The Fallacy of NATO's New Spending Target
NATO 5% GDP pledge: why the headline distracts from capability development
The recent NATO summit’s headline — a collective pledge to reach 5% of GDP on defense — dominated coverage. But experts argue the metric is a political salve rather than a strategy. The core concern is that a raw spending benchmark encourages countries to focus on totals instead of the specific capabilities Europe actually needs: air defense, ammunition production, logistics, and modular interoperability. Short-term wins like counting Ukraine support toward the 3.5% core defense target are useful, but overall emphasis should shift to capability-based targets and procurement standards.
Why capability targets matter for European defense readiness
Capability development targets mean specifying the types and quantities of systems Europe needs — not just budgets. Europe faces fragmentation: dozens of national procurement lines, unique ammunition calibers, and incompatible variants that make collective operations logistically nightmarish. Examples include post-Ukraine purchases that introduced mismatched CV90 ammunition, NH90 helicopter procurement delays caused by bespoke requirements, and differing Leopard tank variants that complicate interoperability.
Defense industrial base reform and procurement harmonization
Long-term solutions center on creating a functional European Defense Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) through pooled procurement, co-production rules tied to EU funding, and tighter standards for interoperability. The EU’s conditional funding incentives for joint procurement and manufacturing can drive consolidation. Smart pooling reduces waste, prevents duplicate production lines, and builds resilient ammunition and vehicle supply chains — essential for sustained high-intensity conflict and logistical readiness.
Burden-sharing, specialization, and strategic autonomy
Experts recommend role specialization across Europe rather than identical spending targets for all. Frontline states (e.g., Finland, Baltic states) should focus on territorial deterrence; other countries can contribute strategic enablers, industrial scale, or force pools. Creative financing ideas include EU-level borrowing — a proposed 500 billion euro issuance — directed to rearmament and joint procurement, with clear accountability mechanisms to avoid “guns vs. butter” politics.
New moves toward European deterrence and nuclear coordination
Notable developments show Europe is shifting: France and the UK agreed to coordinate nuclear planning more closely, and several states are reforming defense postures. These steps are early moves toward strategic autonomy, not replacements for the U.S. extended deterrent. Policymakers should combine short-term fixes (counts for Ukraine support, fast ammunition lines) with mid-term structural reforms (EU procurement rules, capability targets) to create a credible, interoperable European defense.
Bottom line: The headline 5% pledge is politically useful but operationally insufficient. Europe needs capability-driven targets, pooled procurement, and industry consolidation to meaningfully deter aggression and sustain high-intensity conflict.
