Lawfare Daily: ‘Big Tech in Taiwan’ with Sam Bresnick

Big Tech in Taiwan: exposure beyond semiconductors and why it matters

This episode explores a CSET report examining how 17 leading U.S. technology firms are economically and operationally entangled with Taiwan. The conversation focuses on more than chip manufacturing: it highlights hardware R&D, data centers, supply chains, foreign direct investment, and labor footprints that shape corporate decision-making in a potential China-Taiwan contingency.

Supply chain risk: the core vulnerability for U.S. tech firms

Supply chains are the single largest source of exposure for U.S. companies operating around Taiwan. Because Taiwan and China form a joint hub for global electronics manufacturing, disruption from conflict — or coercion targeting Taiwan-based firms with operations in China — could imperil production of consumer electronics and critical hardware. Unlike short-term losses of revenue or isolated R&D disruptions, reconstituting complex, cross-border supply ecosystems would take years.

FDI, data centers, and R&D footprints in Taiwan

The report finds that a smaller subset of firms account for most Taiwan exposure. Google leads identified Greenfield FDI at roughly $1.4 billion (partly linked to announced but unclear data center projects), Apple around $400 million, and Microsoft and Amazon in the mid-to-upper-$200 million range. Taiwan also hosts growing data centers and hardware R&D hubs for companies like Google, Apple, and Microsoft — signaling Taiwan’s rise as a hardware and AI infrastructure node.

Workforce and operational ties: practical implications

Google appears to have the largest Taiwan-based workforce — thousands of employees across 30+ countries — while other firms maintain smaller technical or retail footprints. Job postings used as a proxy show strong demand for hardware engineers and technical service staff, underscoring the island’s specialized talent pool in electronics and device manufacturing.

De-risking versus decoupling: strategic policy choices

The episode emphasizes de-risking — relocating or diversifying supply chains to Southeast Asia and India — rather than full decoupling from China. De-risking is complex and gradual; moving final assembly does not instantly replace parts produced in China. The guest recommends government roles in facilitating relocation, pre-conflict scenario planning, and clearer contracting to reduce ambiguity when firms provide capabilities in crises (for example, satellite communications).

Lessons and next steps

• Prioritize supply-chain mapping and chokepoint identification for electronics and advanced components.
• Track and evaluate hardware R&D and data center investments as operational exposure metrics.
• Use government contracting and pre-planned scenarios to reduce ambiguity during geopolitical crises.

Overall, the episode reframes Taiwan exposure as multifaceted — not just semiconductors — and makes clear that supply-chain resilience and smart public-private planning will determine how U.S. tech firms can respond if a China-Taiwan crisis emerges.